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SCOTT v. HARRIS 
UCHENNA EVANS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an 8-1 decision in Scott v. Harris,1 the Supreme Court reversed 
an Eleventh Circuit decision that had denied qualified immunity to a 
police officer sued by a fleeing motorist who was rendered 
quadriplegic when his car was pushed over an embankment by the 
officer’s vehicle.2 The Court held that the officer did not violate the 
motorist’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
seizure and that the officer was entitled to summary judgment.3 Both 
the federal district court and the Eleventh Circuit had ruled in favor 
of the respondent, denying the officer’s summary judgment motion 
based on qualified immunity after finding a Fourth Amendment 
violation.4 
II.  FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In March 2001, a Coweta County, Georgia deputy police officer 
clocked a car driven by Victor Harris traveling 73 miles per hour in a 
55-mile-per-hour zone and flashed his lights to initiate a traffic stop. 
Rather than stopping, Mr. Harris fled from the officer, at times driving 
more than 85 miles per hour on a two-lane road.5 Upon hearing a 
request for help, Officer Timothy Scott joined the pursuit and forced 
Harris into a shopping center, where police unsuccessfully attempted 
to box him in. After further pursuit, Scott considered engaging a 
“Precision Intervention Technique” (“PIT”) maneuver, which ideally 
would have caused Harris’s car to spin out, but decided against it. 
Instead, Scott applied a push-bumper technique to the rear of Harris’s 
 
 *  2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1779. 
 4. Id. at 1773–74. 
 5. Id. at 1772. 
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car, which caused Harris to lose control of his car, crash over the 
embankment, and suffer severe injuries that rendered him 
quadriplegic.6 
Harris sued Scott under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive use of 
force resulting in an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.7 Scott moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified 
immunity from suit. Scott also asserted that no Fourth Amendment 
violation existed because at the time of contact, the law was not 
sufficiently clear to put him on notice that his actions were unlawful.8 
The district court denied Scott’s motion for summary judgment.9 The 
Eleventh Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal and held that Scott 
did not have qualified immunity for two reasons: (1) a jury could find 
that his actions were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and 
(2) the law was clear at the time of the incident that an automobile 
could be used as deadly force.10 
The Eleventh Circuit said the test established in Tennessee v. 
Garner11 was applicable to the case because Scott’s contact constituted 
deadly force.12 Under the Garner test, a court is to decide whether the 
officer had probable cause to believe that the alleged criminal was 
involved in a crime that posed or threatened to pose serious physical 
harm, and whether the crime that initiated the chase posed an 
imminent threat of serious physical harm.13 The Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that Scott’s use of deadly force was impermissible because 
these factors were not present, and “deadly force cannot be used in 
the absence of the Garner preconditions.”14 In addition, the Eleventh 
Circuit determined that Scott should have been on notice that using 
deadly force to stop a crime in which there was no imminent threat of 
 
 6. Id. at 1773. 
 7. Harris v. Coweta County, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003). 
 8. Id. at *16–18. 
 9. Id. at *38. 
 10. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 821 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d 127 S. Ct. 1769 
(2007). 
 11. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 12. Although Garner did not define deadly force, other cases have held that deadly force is 
that which is substantially likely to result in death. However, whether the force used was deadly 
was not in issue, as Scott admitted, and the court took judicial notice that the force used was 
deadly. The Court here did not believe that whether the force was deadly was relevant. 
 13. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
 14. Harris, 433 F.3d at 819. 
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physical harm to the officer or others was unconstitutional.15 Scott 
appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.16 
III.  HOLDING & RATIONALE 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that Scott’s actions 
were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and thus that he was 
entitled to summary judgment.17 Scalia wrote that courts must 
consider a threshold question to resolve qualified immunity issues: 
whether the alleged facts show a violation of a constitutional right.18 
Only upon a determination that a constitutional right has been 
violated may a court proceed to ask whether the right was clearly 
established.19 
The majority began its analysis by endorsing the two-step process 
for qualified immunity cases that it set forth in Wilson v. Layne.20 This 
test requires that courts first decide whether a constitutional right has 
been violated, before deciding whether an officer is entitled to 
qualified immunity. In Wilson, the Court unanimously decided that 
the Fourth Amendment had been violated when reporters 
accompanied federal officers during their execution of search 
warrants in individuals’ homes. After establishing that a right had 
been violated, the Court then held in an 8-1 decision that the officers 
enjoyed qualified immunity.21 The Court in Wilson decided the 
constitutional issue, even though the case could have been decided on 
a non-constitutional basis by deciding first whether the officers 
enjoyed qualified immunity, eliminating the need to reach whether 
there was a Fourth Amendment violation. 
In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified 
immunity, the Court looks to the officer’s actions and knowledge at 
the time of the alleged conduct. In Hope v. Pelzer,22 the Court 
determined that case law need not exist with the same facts as the 
conduct at issue in order to show that a right was clearly established 
 
 15. Id. at 820. 
 16. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2006). 
 17. Id. at 1779. 
 18. Id. at 1774. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). 
 21. Id. at 617–18. 
 22. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
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at law.23 What mattered was that the officer either was put on notice 
or received a fair warning that the conduct at issue was 
unconstitutional. Such notice could be established through general 
principles, not just case law.24 Whatever the rationale, the Court later 
reaffirmed the two-part test in Saucier v. Katz,25 the current test used 
in the instant case, which requires: (1) the Court to ask, “[t]aken in the 
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts 
alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”26 
(2) If the actions violate a constitutional right, then the Court must 
determine “whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the 
specific context of the case.”27 
In analyzing the first prong of Wilson—whether a constitutional 
right has been violated—there was no dispute that by applying his 
bumper to Harris’s vehicle, Officer Scott made a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.28 Because the touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness, whether a violation occurred depends 
on if Officer Scott’s actions were reasonable. The parties agreed that 
courts decide whether a seizure using excessive force violated a 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights under the test set forth in 
Graham v. Connor,29 but they disagreed about how to determine 
whether an action was objectively reasonable.30 
The respondent argued that the issue was not one for the justices 
to decide, but rather one for the jury because the lower courts already 
determined that, based on Garner, there was enough evidence for a 
jury to decide that the officer’s actions were unconstitutional.31 Harris 
relied on testimony that evidenced both that Officer Scott was not 
adequately trained to execute a PIT maneuver and that it would be 
unreasonable to bump a car progressing at a high rate of speed.32 
 
 23. Id. at 741. 
 24. Id.; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997). 
 25. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 26. Id. at 201. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2006); Brief for Petitioner at 8, Scott v. Harris, 
127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 15-1631). In Brower v. Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989), the Court 
established that use of a police vehicle to deliberately stop a fleeing suspect is a seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 29. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 30. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776. 
 31. Brief for Respondent at 29, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 15-1631). 
 32. Id. at 8. 
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However, only Justice Stevens (in dissent) agreed that the Court 
should have let a jury decide whether Officer Scott’s actions were 
reasonable.33 
Scott, on the other hand, argued that Garner should not apply 
because case law had not clearly established that using a police car to 
bump a speeding vehicle constituted deadly force.34 Distinguishing 
Garner from his case, Scott maintained that in Garner a gun was used, 
a wholesale difference from using a vehicle to bump a fleeing 
motorist’s vehicle. An additional distinction is that in Garner, the 
fleeing individual was on foot and unarmed, whereas in the instant 
case the fleeing individual used a car to escape police. 
Aside from these distinguishing facts, Scott contended that the key 
question was whether, at the time of contact, the officer reasonably 
believed that vehicle contact was needed to avoid a greater harm of 
bodily injury or death. Scott urged the Court to use the balancing test 
set forth in Graham.35 The Graham test, Scott argued, requires that 
reasonableness be gauged by balancing the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 
countervailing governmental interests at stake.36 
The Court wholeheartedly adopted Scott’s position. The Court’s 
impression of the case is apparent from its phrasing of the issue: 
“whether a law enforcement official can, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his 
public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s car from 
behind.”37 Stating that the use of deadly force was a non-issue, the 
Court concluded that the real issue was whether Scott’s actions were 
reasonable.38 Therefore, the Court stated that Garner had no 
application to this case, which the Court found bore little resemblance 
to the facts in Garner.39 Quoting the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
 
 33. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 34. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 14–15. 
 35. Id. at 8. The Eleventh Circuit did apply the Graham test; however, its reliance on 
Garner led to its conclusion that under Graham, Scott’s actions were not reasonable. 
Respondent, likewise, argued that analyzing the case under either Garner or Graham without 
the Garner pre-conditions would result in finding of a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Brief for Respondent, supra note 31, at 26. 
 36. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 8. 
 37. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772 (majority opinion). 
 38. Id. at 1778. 
 39. Id. at 1777. 
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Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Department,40 the Court said that 
“‘Garner had nothing to do with one car striking another or even with 
car chases in general . . . . A police car’s bumping a fleeing car is, in 
fact, not much like a policeman’s shooting a gun so as to hit a 
person.’”41 Garner, the Court said, did not provide an “on-off switch” 
that could be used to determine the constitutionality of an officer’s 
actions once a court found that deadly force was used.42 
Instead, the Court endorsed the Graham test, stating that to 
determine the reasonableness of a seizure the Court “‘must balance 
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental 
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’”43 Perhaps the most 
important factor in this balancing test for the Court was that Harris 
posed a significant risk to the public and therefore, regardless of 
whether bumping the rear of the vehicle constituted deadly force, 
Scott’s actions were reasonable.44 
IV.  IMPACT 
Despite the Court’s near unanimous agreement that Officer Scott 
was entitled to qualified immunity, there was one element in the case 
that was rather unique that might caution against using this decision 
to support a mechanical rule heavily favoring police action—the 
videotape of the chase. The Court viewed the videotape of the chase 
during oral argument and even placed a link to the tape on the 
Court’s website next to the decision for the public to view.45 The Court 
specifically said that its decision was fairly easy to make, but one 
could fairly say the ease with which the Court made its decision was 
possible only because of what were unquestionably horrifying scenes 
on the videotape. 
 
 40. Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 962 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 41. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777 (quoting Adams, 962 F.2d at 1577 (Edmondson, J., dissenting)). 
Although the Court quotes the Eleventh Circuit’s decision here, Adams was actually decided 
before the Court established its two-part test requiring courts to determine first whether a 
constitutional right had been violated. Therefore Adams did not reach the question whether 
using a police vehicle to stop a high-speed pursuit violated the Fourth Amendment, and instead 
concerned the qualified immunity issue only. 
 42. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777. 
 43. Id. at 1778 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
 44. Id. at 1778–79. 
 45. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06slipopinion.html. 
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In a summary judgment motion, courts are to accept the 
allegations of fact most sympathetic to the nonmoving party.46 The 
district court and the Eleventh Circuit both found that genuine issues 
of material fact existed such that a reasonable juror could conclude 
that Officer Scott’s actions were unreasonable in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. However, the Court wrote that where a record 
exists that blatantly contradicts the plaintiffs’ version of the facts, 
courts should not rely on the plaintiff’s statement.47 Here, the Court 
after viewing the videotape, determined that no reasonable juror 
could believe Harris’s version of the facts.48 
When both lower courts decided in favor of Harris, arguably only 
on the basis of the videotape could the Court conclude no reasonable 
juror could find that the “car chase that respondent initiated in this 
case posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury 
to others.”49 Therefore, while a clear 8-1 majority signaled that even 
the use of deadly force in this case was objectively reasonable, it is not 
clear that if evidence such as a videotape is not available lower courts 
are to assume a rigid position. 
The two concurring opinions state the decision should not be read 
as a mechanical, per se rule.50 Importantly, though, no other justices 
signed onto these positions. Therefore, for simple ease of 
administration, when it can be shown that the public could be 
endangered, police officers might have far-ranging license to use even 
deadly force without fear of having to defend themselves in a suit for 
liability. 
Even if the majority opinion does in fact set forth a mechanical 
rule to follow in cases in which deadly force is used to terminate high-
speed pursuits, the case leaves open the possibility of setting forth a 
new test to use in qualified immunity cases. Despite endorsing the 
two-step test, the fact that the Court relied on the videotape calls into 
question whether the Court will continue to use the two-step process 
in deciding qualified immunity cases. In a footnote, the majority noted 
that the wisdom of the two-step process requiring consideration of 
 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). 
 47. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1779. 
 50. Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 1781 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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constitutional issues first has been questioned in the past.51 However, 
that issue was not necessarily before the Court to consider, and 
furthermore the Court found the constitutional question in this case 
easy to decide.52 
Therefore, the majority said the “better approach” in the case was 
to determine the constitutional question first, in line with precedent.53 
However, if the constitutional question is not as easy as it was for the 
Court to decide here, one reading of the footnote could be that the 
better approach would be to decide the qualified immunity issue first 
if the immunity issue is easy to decide. The majority’s footnote also 
leaves open to interpretation how to determine the better approach in 
deciding qualified immunity cases. Could the rule be that when the 
constitutional issue is not easy, courts should follow Scott v. Harris and 
use the two-step process, but when the qualified immunity issue is 
easy, courts should decide that issue first? 
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, explicitly states that Saucier 
should be revisited and that lower courts should be able to decide 
whichever question provides for the easiest disposition first.54 Justice 
Ginsburg, in her concurrence, leaves open the possibility that Saucier 
could be revisited when that specific issue is raised properly before 
the Court.55 Even so, it is not clear that the Court would take an 
opportunity to clarify the issue unless the lower courts signal that the 
issue should be clarified. For ease of administration, the lower courts 
may very well apply a mechanical rule and avoid causing a split in the 
circuits. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
With this decision, the Court endorsed a two-step approach to 
resolving qualified immunity cases. However, despite the near-
majority decision, it is not clear that this case stands for a proposition 
that police have free license to use deadly force in fleeing felon cases 
without consequence. This decision still leaves room for the argument 
that unless there is uncontroverted evidence that a fleeing felon poses 
 
 51. Id. at 1774 n.4 (majority opinion). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 1779–80 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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a significant risk of physical harm to the public, deadly force may be 
unconstitutional. 
